Structural and Functional Analysis of Unicameral and Bicameral Legislative Systems; Justificatory Grounds and Critical study

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Ph.D. student of Public Law, Islamic Azad University, South Tehran branch

2 Assistant Professor, Islamic Azad University, Shiraz branch

Abstract

The bicameral legislative systems are the historical product of class societies, especially feudal systems in the 17th and 18th centuries. Other countries also created bicameral systems, influenced by the book of the Spirit of Law, the classical work of Charles de Montesquieu, who saw the British parliamentary system as the origin of progress, development and democracy. The legislative experience of some countries, such as Denmark, Iceland and the State of Nebraska, has led to changes in the structure of the legislature and the conversion of the bicameral parliament to a unicameral system. In this descriptive-analytic study, we compare unicameral and bicameral legislative systems. These systems have been examined by standards of law stability, legislative responsibility, legislative authority, decision-making quality, efficiency and economic viability. The greatest benefits of dual-parliamentary systems are legislative oversight and balance, pluralism and minority participation in the legislature. Nevertheless, the economics and legal efficiency of unicameral systems along with accelerating the decision-making process have led to change of some bicameral systems to unicameral ones.

Keywords


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